index

AFGHANISTAN, THE PERFECT STORM:

Magical Thinking -- Five Enduring Policy Myths

Al QAEDA, by its own declaration, is our sworn enemy. Its core is a small cadre of top leaders ...

those who inspire, recruit, motivate, finance, organize, equip, and direct the “faithful” who execute

their barbarities. The shibboleth that "poverty breeds terrorism" is basic nonsense . . . Poverty and

hopelessness breed foot-soldiers and suicidal dupes.

But its top leaders derive from the elite of their own societies (the late Osama Bin Laden, a prime example). They deploy great financial resources, superior education, charisma, ingenuity, and skills in logistics, engineering, weaponry, media savvy, and technology. They command potent political links, admiration in the Muslim world, and global reach. One of our government's primary stupidities has been

to underestimate this enemy. By now, we should know better . . . we trained and armed many of them

during their expulsion of the Soviets from Afghanistan.

Nearly all top Al Qaeda leaders are Sunni Muslim Arabs, mainly Saudis. But Al Qaeda has metastasized into a worldwide franchise with little hierarchy and near-autonomy of action. No senior Al Qaeda leaders remain in Afghanistan; as of now they primarily inhabit Pakistan. Franchise leaders are in Yemen, Somalia, western Europe, Canada, and the U.S. as “sleepers.” Why then, are WE in Afghanistan? Why have we conflated Al Qaeda with . . .

THE TALIBAN. We paint the Taliban as aliens dropped into Afghanistan from outer space. In fact, the Taliban are ethnic Pashtuns -- native Afghanis and Pakistanis. This is their home region -- they know every bazaar, every cave, mountain, valley, blind alley, every trap . . . and they know their own people. They also are fanatical and ruthless. Their perversions of the Q’uran are a desecration of Islam ... extreme even by Saudi Wahabbi standards. But for all their evils, the Taliban are our nominal enemy only because we occupy their land. The Taliban have no global aspirations, they have never attacked America, nor have they threatened our country. Afghanistan is the graveyard of empires – Persian, Arab and Mongol conquests, Turks, British, and Soviets before us. Taliban and their Mujaheddin predecessors are nationalists at base; throughout history, they’ve outlasted and defeated foreign invaders.

Under the noses of a hopelessly corrupt Karzai regime, the Taliban have created a de facto shadow government controlling ever-widening swaths of the country. They enforce acquiescence, often provide rough justice, and gain popular support. We continue to delude ourselves as being "liberators," “advisors,” “trainers,” or whatever other sophistry rationalizes our presence there. Growing Afghani majorities

see us as occupiers. Their perceptions, not ours, count most in their own country.

COUNTER-INSURGENCY DOCTRINE. General Petraeus’s counter-insurgency theory "to persevere until the government and army here are strong enough to stand on their own” is flawed on its face; it is

one more instance of wish-think. Remember "Operation Iraqi Freedom" – that obscene “commercial” engraved on the Arlington tombstones of our soldiers and Marines fallen in that misbegotten war.

Counter-insurgency strategy is a bridge of cards, built upon a swamp of unchallenged assumptions -- doomed to failure, no matter how many troops and how much hardware our military requests and wins.

To understand how we got here, consider these five unexamined assumptions (magical thinking):

First, the persistent myth of TRAINING: "Training and increasing numbers of Afghani troops and police will allow them to take responsibility for their own security." In fact, the loyalties and motivation of Afghan security forces are the salient problems. Their loyalties are to tribe above all, and to their local warlords by extension. Bone-deep regime corruption facilitates Taliban infiltration of Afghani police and army.

No amount of technical training can overcome these fatal faults. Our "training" mantra perseveres in

the face of repeated failures at such follies in Vietnam and which continue in Iraq.

(By contrast, the Taliban do not lack “training” or motivation.)

Second is our "NATION BUILDING" conceit. Other nations are not ours to build -- that notion reflects the Arrogance of Empire. The corrupt and feckless Karzai regime has neither force, nor effect, nor loyalty even in Kabul let alone in the rest of the country. Why do we prop up this moribund corpse?

Third, there is NO CONVENTIONAL MILITARY SOLUTION – no “WIN” -- to this conflict of political, ideological, religious, and cultural dimensions. Our political leaders admit this in words. But their actions betray their words. The Army and the Marines basically are about real estate. Marines storm and hold beachheads, the Army clears and holds territory. But Afghanistan's landscape bears no relevance to

Al Qaeda. They prove this by their very absence. Playing whack-a-mole against this enemy is fruitless;

Al Qaeda and its franchises resurface on a multitude of different fronts: Yemen, Somalia, Algeria, the western Sahara. And here in North America and western Europe, due to Al Qaeda’s radicalization of young Muslim immigrants.

Fourth, the notion that we can FORCE THE ENEMY TO FIGHT ON OUR TERMS. The British learned to their sorrow that American colonists would not stand still for classic European set battles.

Why can't we learn insurgency from our own history? How can a handful of village mechanics, working in Afghani back-alley garages, continue to rig roadside bombs and suicide hardware which to this day are still killing hundreds of our finest and thousands of their own? Whatever happened to our vaunted technological superiority?

Fifth, the DIRE CONSEQUENCES OF WITHDRAWAL. We've heard this one before. MacNamara's "Domino Theory:" "If VietNam falls, so goes the rest of Asia." What really happened? Communist Vietnam became our enthusiastic trading partner. Communist China became our central banker and chief creditor. Other states in the region basically went their own ways. Then came Rumsfeld's "Reverse Domino:" "Toppling Saddam Hussein will plant the seeds of democracy in Iraq and spread over the Middle East." What really is happening? Iraq's blood-letting between Sunni and Shi'a continues unabated . . . while Kurds duck for cover. Purple fingers created a fetching TV widget. But they didn't point toward democracy in Iraq.

Chicken-hawk sloganeers who cry "cut-and-run" should remember their history and be informed by President Reagan's withdrawal from Lebanon (February 1984). Our military presence and tragic casualties in Beirut counted for nothing whatsoever in that still-troubled state. Now we hear that a "failure of mission" in Afghanistan would "empower the Taliban and again provide a haven for Al Qaeda." But the Taliban already are empowered. In our absence, they will return to their struggle for power against the hereditary warlords. It is their very own Civil War, not ours. Havens for Al Qaeda are plentiful world-wide. We must not continue deluding ourselves that we can control or occupy a global American Empire.

We cannot allow American Exceptionalism to be used as a cover for world domination.

FOOTNOTE: Actually, the gradual shift in our government’s policy toward decapitation of Al Qaeda’s senior leaders comes closer to a viable solution. (Fortunately, we dispatched Bin Laden with no help from our “ally.” As we now know, his continuing protection was no accident.)

The key to crippling Al Qaeda is to liquidate its topmost tier -- perhaps 250 to 500 individuals. Simply because these leaders are so rare, they are virtually irreplaceable in one generation. We must destroy the brain power which conceives and executes such abominations as 9/11 and massive suicide bombings. We must ... finally ... understand that Al Qaeda’s top leaders truly are Evil Geniuses. Consider what they have achieved: massive world-wide logistics and financial resources; inspiration and support for their violent brand of Islam throughout the Muslim world; charisma to recruit legions of suicide-bombers and dedicated fighters; strategic and tactical resiliency: weaponry and bomb engineering which have devastated our properties, diplomatic offices, military positions, naval vessels and inflicted untold death and injury upon

our troops, allies, their own people.

And no more self-blinding: we should seek out area experts who understand local languages and cultures, structures and values of the opponent; the population in which he moves; and his physical environment.

We must destroy Al Qaeda top leaders whenever and wherever they surface: Afghanistan's Hindu Kush, Pakistan's northwest territories, Yemen, western Sahara, the south Philippines, the Brazil/Paraguay /Argentina triangle, and any other ungoverned spot on the globe.

Drone air strikes have killed some ranking Al Qaeda. But which ranks and at what cost? Since drone intelligence sometimes can’t distinguish between terrorist camps and wedding parties, inevitable “collateral damage” (murdered civilians) occurs. These mis-targeted strikes are a prime recruiting tool for Al Qaeda.

As real-time intelligence improves, drones may well become another "weapon of choice."

“Boots on the Ground” – massive military invasion -- is the absolute worst option.

Here is the best option: Far better for us to use appropriately armed Special Forces, targetting specifically

on Al Qaeda top leaders. That's what Special Forces can do ... And as they’ve proved, they are very good at doing it. ##